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Overview
y early warning systems
y project overview
y architecture
y challenges and technologies
 efficient and effective classification and detection
 enablement of required cooperation
y summary
3/24Project AMSEL© Michael Meier  
Early Warning Systems [1]
y aim at
 detecting yet unclassified but potentially harmful system behavior
 based on preliminary indications
 establish hypotheses, predictions and advices
in not yet completely understood situations
 include two meanings of „early“
 “fast”: start early in time in order to avoid/minimize damage
 “incomplete”: process uncertain and incomplete information
[1] 08102 Manifesto -- Perspectives Workshop: Network Attack Detection and Defense. 
Dagstuhl, 2008.
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Project AMSEL - Goals
y development of an EWS for automatic
 privacy and confidentiality preserving 
 detection
 of known and unknown
 automatized attacks (malware)
 reporting of
 incidents
 integration into a situation picture
Automatisch Malware Sammeln und Erkennen Lernen
automatically collect and learn to detect malware
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Approach




 malware analysis technology 
à controlled execution and observation of malware
 machine learning
à generation of detection criteria (signatures)
 sub-process reporting
 central provision of detection criteria
 update of detection systems
 central reporting of detected incidents
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 distribute and deploy signatures
 report alerts centrally
Ö combination of misuse detection and anomaly detection techniques
 provide specific alerts with low false positive rates
 detect a priori unknown attacks
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Deployment Scenario
y protection level achieved and quality of situation picture depend on 
number and placement of deployed CL and DA boxes
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Challenges and Technologies





y enablement of required cooperation
 balance/resolve conflicting interests
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Malware Collector
y collecting new malware as early as possible
y Nepenthes and Amun
 low-interaction server honeypots
 emulate vulnerabilities
 catches/collects malware binaries
 typically downloaded after initial compromise
y possible extensions
 honey clients
 collecting drive-by-downloaded files
 spam traps
 collecting attached files or targets of URLs
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Malware Analysis
y inspecting and extracting appropriate features characterizing and 
distinguishing malware and benign programs
y static analysis
 static features: directly extracted from malware samples
 byte sequences of code or data segments
 control flow graphs extracted by disassemblers
 morphing/obfuscation techniques and tools
 generate programs of equal/similar functionality but different static feature 
instantiations
 30.000 new unique (wrt. static features) malware samples a day
à polymorphic variants of a few malware types
 would require to handle 30.000 new signatures a day
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Malware Analysis
y dynamic analysis
 dynamic features: behavior observed during execution
 e.g. trace of systems calls 
 logic bombs
 difficult to trigger the malicious execution path during analysis
Ö dynamic analysis more promising for malware analysis and detection
y CWSandbox is used as dynamic analysis system
 execution in a controlled and monitored environment
 behavior report: chronologically ordered list of system calls performed by 
the program during analysis
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Automatic Signature Generation
1. group similar malware behavior reports
 (get the few malware types of the 30.000 malware samples a day)
 clustering of behavior reports
2. create a signature for each group
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Clustering
y requires a distance/similarity metric for program behavior reports
 candidates, e.g.
 edit distance 
 normalized compression distance
 Manhattan distance (n-gram vectorization)
 based on experimental evaluation [1] we chose Manhattan
y hierarchical clustering algorithms, e.g., single-link, complete-link, 
WPGMA, UPGMA, fuzzy clustering
 currently under investigation: complete-link
[1] Measuring Similarity of Malware Behavior. 5th IEEE LCN Workshop on 
Security in Communications Networks, Oct. 20th 2009, Zurich.
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Signature Generation
y given a cluster C determine sequences of system calls 
 that are shared among all behavior reports of cluster C
 but are absent in behavior reports of the good pool
y determine shared substrings using Ukkonen‘s algorithm
y create a signature that matches, if all shared substrings occurred
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Malware Detection System
y integration of existing behavior detection systems requires compatible 
feature domains
 features extracted using CWSandbox and used for signature generation 
and features observed/monitored by the detection system need to be 
compatible
 signature transformations need to be realized
y new detection systems are developed
 based jSAM – Java Signature Analysis Module
 optimized multi-step-signature matching engine
 expressive signature language EDL (Event Description Language)
 full support of the behavior features used by EWS supplied signatures

































privacy and confidentiality protection
y information exchange
 private and confidential information
 allows outsiders (competitors, customers) insights into security incidents
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Cooperation Enablement
y consideration of conflicting confidentiality and availability interests  of 
participating and involved parities
y resolution of conflicts by use of information reductions, e.g. 
pseudonymization
y detailed study of
 flow of information inside the EWS
 participating and involved parties and their interest wrt. to particular 
information
Ö two classes of EWS functionality
 analysis: requires linkability of information
à are two ip addresses equal?
 reaction: requires disclosure of original information
à block this ip address
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Exchanged Information
y timestamp
y alert signature name
y sending endpoint of MHS
y receiving endpoint of MTS
y download endpoint of MDS
y receiving endpoint of MDZ
y vulnerability module name
y receiving endpoint of CL box
y observing endpoint of DA box
y malware exploit payload
y malware sample payload
personal data of 
victim systems
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Participating and Involved Parties
y collecting and learning box




 malware host system
 malware distribution system
 malware target system
 malware drop zone
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Conflicting Interests (Examples)
y victim systems
 want to keep their endpoints 
confidential
y collecting and learning boxes 
 want to keep their existence 
confidential
y threat repository 
 needs to disclose endpoints of 
MDZ and MDS for blacklisting 
sites involved in an malware 
outbreak
y alert repository
 need to link all data to create a 
situation picture
Ö defining a suitable balance between conflicting interests
 in some cases a given interest is only supported for repositories and not for box 
owners
 confidentiality interest of VS is only partially supported – box and repository 
owners can link and disclose information in most cases
Ö pseudonymization techniques are used for tailoring linkable or disclosable
pseudonyms
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Summary
y architecture of an automatic EWS
y existing approaches are used for malware collection and analysis
y focus of our ongoing research
 clustering of malware behavior
 generating behavior signatures
 balancing conflicting availability and confidentiality requirements
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Thank You!
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Optimization
y clustering and signature generation are time-consuming
y for each new malware behavior 
 check if existing signature matches
 if no signature matches
 determine cluster closest to the new behavior
 add new behavior to closest cluster
 generate new signature for this cluster
y complete re-clustering is performed periodically
